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Abstract—Integrating visible light communication (VLC) and
radio-frequency (RF) networks can improve the performance
of communication systems in terms of coverage and data rates.
However, adding RF links to VLC networks weakens the secrecy
performance due to the broadcast and ubiquitous nature of RF
links. This paper studies the physical layer security (PLS) in
cooperative non-orthogonal multiple access (CoNOMA) hybrid
VLC/RF systems. Consider a VLC system, where two entrusted
users close to a VLC access point (AP) help an out-of-coverage
legitimate user using RF signals in the presence of an eaves-
dropper. The AP transmits data to both entrusted users and the
legitimate user using the principle of NOMA, where the entrusted
users harvest energy from the received light intensity, decode the
legitimate user’s message, forward it using a RF link, and then
decode their messages. It is required to maximize the secrecy rate
at the legitimate user under quality-of-service (QoS) constraints
using beamforming and DC-bias and power allocation. Different
solutions are proposed for both active and passive eavesdropper
cases, using semidefinite relaxation, zero-forcing, beamforming,
and jamming. Numerical results compare between the different
proposed approaches and show how the proposed approaches
contribute in improving the secrecy performance of the proposed
model.
Index Terms—Beamforming, cooperative NOMA hybrid vis-
ible light communication/radio-frequency networks, physical
layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasing need for high data rates and the
overcrowded radio-frequency (RF) spectrum, researchers and
engineers have recently explored different untapped spectrum
to transmit data. To exploit the wide license-free visible light
spectrum, visible light communication (VLC) has emerged as
a promising technology to supplement RF wireless networks
[1]. Some previous works on VLC proved that VLC systems
is able to provide data rates up to several Giga-bits/second [2],
[3], which enables them to be qualified to meet the required
high data rates in future wireless networks.
In order to efficiently utilize the available spectrum, non-
orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been introduced
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to increase the spectral efficiency and the fairness of the
communication systems. The principle of NOMA is to send
messages to multiple users using the same frequency/time
resources with different power levels, and use successive
interference cancellation at the users to decode the messages.
NOMA has been investigated, evaluated, and optimized in
VLC networks [4]–[7], where it has been shown that NOMA
outperforms orthogonal multiple access (OMA) schemes in
terms of data rates and fairness.
Applying NOMA in VLC systems doesn’t overcome some
VLC drawbacks such as inter-cell interference, limited cover-
age, and blockage. One method to mitigate such drawbacks
and improve performance is to utilize cooperation among
users using RF links. This cooperation exploits the received
strong signal at some users to help other users, which receives
weak signals by acting as cooperative relays. This scheme,
known as cooperative NOMA (Co-NOMA) was investigated
in RF networks where the strong user serves as a decode-and-
forward (DF) relay, by forwarding the weak user’s message
after decoding it, so that the weak user receives two versions
of the signal, which increases the received signal-to-noise
(SNR). In VLC systems, it is not practical to relay the VLC
received signal at the the strong user using another VLC
link. However, RF links can be used to forward the signals
instead. Thus, the weak user has two options: either to be
served directly by the VLC AP, or to be served through the
hybrid VLC/RF link with the help of the strong user. This
scheme is helpful in VLC systems to overcome the limited
coverage and susceptibilities to blockage of VLC. Authors of
[8] showed that Co-NOMA can improve the sum-rate and the
fairness of a VLC system that consists of one AP and multiple
users and proposed solutions for joint power allocation, link
selection, and user pairing. Authors of [9] showed that Co-
NOMA in VLC networks can mitigate the impact of the inter-
cell interference in multi-cell multi-user VLC systems.
Unfortunately, this form of Co-NOMA in VLC systems
introduces another challenge which is security. VLC systems
are generally more secure than RF systems due to that VLC
links are blocked by objects and can be directed to cover
only small areas that contain authorized users. However, using
Co-NOMA with RF links to reach out-of-coverage users can
compromise security since an eavesdropper may be able to
attain confidential information intended to the legitimate user.
Thus, it is important to study the security of such a Co-NOMA
VLC/RF system.
Several papers in the literature investigated physical layer
2security (PLS) in VLC networks [10]–[14], and in hybrid
VLC/RF networks [15], [16]. Authors of [10] reviewed the
work conducted on optimizing the PLS in VLC and free-space
optical communication networks. Authors of [15] investigated
PLS based on the assumption that the receivers can gather
information from VLC and RF APs at the same time. The
authors designed the RF and VLC beamforming vectors to
null the information rate at the eavesdropper and to minimize
transmit power for energy efficiency purposes. In [16], the
authors used VLC links for the downlink and RF links for
the uplink, and derived the secrecy outage probability for the
RF links when the users use the energy harvested through
the received light intensity to forward their signals to the
AP. However, to our best knowledge, the security of Co-
NOMA hybrid VLC/RF system has not been investigated in
the literature.
Thus, in this work, we investigate and optimize PLS in
Co-NOMA hybrid VLC/RF systems. We consider a system
model that consists of a single VLC AP, two entrusted users,
one destination (legitimate user), and one eavesdropper. The
entrusted users are the users that are served by the VLC
AP directly, and are trusted to decode and forward the
destination’s messages. We assume that the destination and
the eavesdropper are out-of-the coverage of the VLC AP or
blocked (i.e., either far from the AP or in an other room). The
goal of the AP is to transmit data to the entrusted users with
the required quality and to the destination in a secure way.
We assume that transmission to the entrusted users is secured
by the VLC coverage, since the eavesdropper can not tap into
VLC signal. Thus, it remains to secure the destination user
who is served by RF.
We consider two cases for the eavesdropper: Either the
channel-state-information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is avail-
able at the transmitters (i.e., the eavesdropper is active in the
network, but it is not authorized to access some confidential
information), or the CSI is not available (i.e., the transmitters
are unaware of the presence of an eavesdropper). When the
eavesdropper’s CSI is known, we formulate the problem as
maximizing the secrecy capacity at the legitimate user under
quality-of-service (QoS) constraints for the entrusted and
legitimate users. We propose two solutions for such non-
convex problem: The first is based on semidefinite relax-
ation (SDR) and Charnes-Cooper methods, and the second
is based on nulling the signal at the eavesdropper. When the
eavesdropper’s CSI is unknown, we adopt three approaches
to improve the secrecy performance, one is the beamforming
approach and the others are based on injecting artificial noise
to confuse the eavesdropper (jamming). In all the proposed
approaches, we find solutions for the DC-bias, the transmit
power, and the beamforming vector at the entrused users.
Numerical results show that when the eavesdropper’s CSI
is known, the proposed SDR with Charnes-Cooper method
performs better than zero-forcing approach if the eavesdropper
is away from the midpoint between of the entrusted users,
while zero-forcing is better if the eavesdropper is nearer to
the transmitters. If the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable, then
sending artificial noise with beamformers chosen using SDR
or maximum ratio transmission (MRT) performs better than
Fig. 1. A VLC/RF system where the VLC AP transmits to two users within
its coverage, which in turn relay information to a destination using an RF
link while securing the information from the eavesdropper.
beamforming approach, where the weights are designed to
match the channel of the destination without emitting jamming
signal. Numerical results also show that in the presence or
the absence of CSI, the required QoS at the entrusted users
significantly compromises the secrecy performance.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
As shown in Fig. 1, the considered system consists of
one VLC AP, three legitimate users, and one eavesdropper.
Cooperative NOMA based on hybrid VLC/RF is used. We
assume that two entrusted users (U1 and U2) are in the
coverage range of the VLC AP, while the third user D and
the eavesdropper E are not. Using cooperative NOMA, the
AP sends the three signals of the legitimate users using the
same VLC channel, U1 and U2 decode their desired signals
in addition to D’s signal, and forward the latter using an RF
link. U1 and U2 also harvest energy from the received VLC
signal, and use it to forwardD’s signal. The eavesdropper also
receives the forwarded RF signal, which is to be secured.
A. VLC and RF Channel Models
The VLC channel between the AP and the user i is given
by [17]
hi =
(m+ 1)Ap
2πd2i
cosm(φ)goff(θ) cos(θ), (1)
where Ap is the photo-detector (PD) physical area, m =
−
(
log2(cos(θ 1
2
)
)−1
is the Lambertian index, θ 1
2
is the semi-
angle of half power, dj is the distance between the AP and
the user i, gof is the gain of the optical filter, φ is the LED
radiance angle, θ is the PD incidence angle, and f(θ) is the
gain of the optical concentrator given by
f(θ) =
{
n2
sin2(Θ)
, θ ≤ Θ;
0, θ > Θ,
(2)
3where n is the refractive index and Θ is the semi-angle of the
user’s field-of-view (FoV). On the other hand, the RF channel
in an indoor environment between users i and D is given by
[18]
hD,i = H
(RF )
D,i 10
−
L(dD,i)
20 , (3)
where H
(RF )
D,i is the RF multipath propagation channel,
L(dD,i) is the path loss, and dD,i is the distance between
users D and i.
B. Transmission Scheme
Using NOMA, the AP transmits messages to users U1,
U2, and D, with rates R1, R2, and RD using the same VLC
channel by sending a weighted-sum of the codeword symbols
with different weights corresponding to power levels. Since
VLC is realized by modulating light intensity, the transmit
signal must be nonnegative. Hence, the transmitted optical
signal from the AP can be expressed as
y = ν(
√
P1s1 +
√
P2s2 +
√
PDsD) + νb, (4)
where ν is the electrical-to-optical conversion factor measured
in W/A, s1, s2, and sD are codeword symbols assumed to be
with unit peak amplitude |si| < 1, and P1, P2, and PD are
the peak powers assigned to these symbols, respectively, and
b is a DC-bias added to ensure a nonnegative transmit signal.
Note that sD should be forwarded to the destination D by U1
and U2. The messages s1, s2, and sD are assumed to be with
unit power. The received electrical signal at the ith entrusted
user is given by
xi = νρhi(
√
P1s1+
√
P2s2+
√
PDsD)+νρhib+ni, i = 1, 2
(5)
where ρ is the optical-to-electrical conversion factor measured
in A/W, hi, i = 1, 2 are channels between the VLC AP and
users Ui, i = 1, 2, ni is a real-valued zero-mean additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance σ2v = NvBv,
where Nv is the noise power spectral density, and Bv is the
modulation bandwidth.
Following the NOMA technique, the entrusted users first
decode the message of the far user D, then they decode
their messages afterwards. This imposes the following rate
constraints at high SNR, assuming h1 > h2
R1 ≤ Ru1 =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
cρ2ν2h21P1
σ2v
)
, (6)
R2 ≤ Ru2 =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
cρ2ν2h22P2
σ2v + cρ
2ν2h22P1
)
, (7)
RD ≤ Ru1→D = 12 log2
(
1 +
cρ2ν2h21PD
σ2v+cρ
2ν2h21P1+cρ
2ν2h21P2
)
,
(8)
RD ≤ Ru2→D = 12 log2
(
1 +
cρ2ν2h22PD
σ2v+cρ
2ν2h22P1+cρ
2ν2h22P2
)
,
(9)
where c = min{ 12pie eb
2
I2H2pi
} [7] and e is Euler’s number. Since
b is restricted to be greater than or equal to IH2 , we have that
c = 12pie .
Then, each user forwards the message of user D after
encoding it using a secrecy code [19]. In particular, the ith
user sends wis˜D , where |wi|2 ≤ Pr,i and s˜D is the encoded
message of user D. Therefore, the received signal at user D
is given by
xD = hD,1w1s˜D + hD,2w2s˜D + nrf , (10)
where hD,i is the RF channel between Ui and D and nrf is
an additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2RF .
The received signal at the eavesdropper E is given by
xE = hE,1w1s˜D + hE,2w2s˜D + nrf , (11)
where hE,i is the RF channels between Ui and E, and nrf
is Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2RF . We
assume that the bandwidth of the RF channel is a fraction
η of the bandwidth of the VLC channel, where η ∈ (0, 1].
The achievable rate RD must be smaller than the achievable
secrecy rate of the wiretap channel defined by (10) and (11),
leading to [20], [21]
RD
η
≤ Rs = 1
2
log2
(
1 +
h
H
Dww
H
hD
σ2RF
)
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
h
H
Eww
H
hE
σ2RF
)
, (12)
where hD = [hD,1 hD,2]
T , hE = [hE,1 hE,2]
T , and w =
[w1 w2]
T .
C. Energy Harvesting
The entrusted users work also as relays and have the
capability to harvest energy from the received VLC signal
and use it to relay the D’s symbol. To transfer the power, a
capacitor can separate the DC component from the received
electrical signal and forward it to an energy harvesting circuit
[22], [23]. The harvested power at the ith user is given by
[24]
Pr,i = fIDC,iVoc,i, (13)
where f is the fill factor (typically around 0.75), IDC,i =
ρνhib is the DC current received at user i, and Voc,i =
Vt ln(1 +
IDC,i
I0
), where Vt is the thermal voltage and I0 is
the dark saturation current of the PD. Therefore, the harvested
electrical power at the ith user, which is a function of b, can
be written as
Pr,i(b) = fρνVthib ln
(
1 +
ρhiνb
I0
)
. (14)
Next, we describe methods to optimize the performance of
the system under two considerations: Known and unknown
eavesdropper CSI.
D. Problem Statement
Communication in this system has to satisfy the following
constraints. The entrusted users’ rates must satisfy a QoS
constraint given by Ri ≥ Rth, i = 1, 2. Moreover, the power
constraint at the entrusted users must be satisfied, which leads
to |wi|2 ≤ Pr,i(b) where Pr,i(b) is the available power at
the entrusted user. This power is related to the amount of
4harvested optical energy, which depends on the DC bias b. To
minimize signal clipping and guarantee a postive signal, we
require that b ∈ [IH/2, IH ].
Under these constraints, the goal is to maximize the rate RD
under which secrecy can be guaranteed. This problem can be
formulated in different ways, depending on the availability of
the eavesdropper CSI at the transmitters, or its absence. This
problem is discussed in the following sections.
III. PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION GIVEN
EAVESDROPPER’S CSI
In this case, we assume that the CSI of the eavesdropper
is known at the AP and at the entrusted users. This allows
the AP and the entrusted users to encode D’s message at the
appropriate rate, so that the message can be sent from the AP
to U1 and U2 to D, securely. Hence, our goal is to maximize
the secrecy rate of the destination D while satisfying the
constraints. The optimization problem can be formulated as
follows
max
w,b,P1,P2,PD
Rs (15a)
s.t. |wi|2 ≤ Pr,i(b), i = 1, 2 (15b)
Rui ≥ Rth, i = 1, 2, (15c)
Rui→D ≥ ηRs, i = 1, 2, (15d)√
P1 +
√
P2 +
√
PD ≤ IH − b (15e)
IH
2
≤ b ≤ IH , (15f)
where Ru1 and Ru2 are the achievable rates for decoding s1
and s2 at U1, U2 and defined at (6) and (7), respectively,
Ru1→D and Ru2→D are the achievable rates for decoding sD
at users U1 and U2 and defined at (8) and (9), respectively, IH
is the maximum allowed input current to the VLC transmitter,
and η is the RF-to-VLC bandwidth ratio satisfying η ∈ [0, 1].
Constraint (15b) is the individual power constraint at the
users (i.e., the transmit power must be less than or equal
to the harvested power). On the other hand, constraint (15c)
is imposed to achieve the required QoS constraint at the
entrusted users, and constraint (15d) is imposed to assure that
the secrecy rate of the destination is not limited by the first hop
(VLC link). Finally, constraints (15e) and (15f) are imposed to
guarantee that the input signal to the LED remains within the
linear operational range to avoid clipping, and to guarantee
the nonnegativity of the input signal.
Note that problem (15) is non-convex because the objective
function is a difference between two concave functions. In
what follows, we reformulate the problem in order to obtain
a simple solution.
A. Problem Reformulation
By rewriting the objective function as
Rs =
1
2
log2
(
σ2RF + h
H
Dww
H
hD
σ2RF + h
H
Eww
HhE
)
, (16)
problem (15) can be equivalently written as
max
w,b,P1,P2,PD
σ2RF + h
H
Dww
H
hD
σ2RF + h
H
Eww
HhE
, (17a)
s.t. (15b)-(15f). (17b)
The objective function in (17) is nonconvex. However,
in the following, we provide an efficient solution that finds
feasible users’ powers, beamforming vector, and the DC-
bias jointly, while achieving good performance. First, it is
important to note that increasing the value of the variable b
increases the harvested energy, but decreases the total peak
power PT = (
√
P1 +
√
P2 +
√
PD)
2 that is used to transmit
signals s1, s2, and sD . In other words, increasing the DC-bias
helps in increasing the objective function but tightens the QoS
constraints (i.e., decreases Rui and Rui→D). Therefore, our
goal of designing the DC-bias and the users’ powers is to
find the maximum value of b that achieves the constraints or
equivalently, to find the minimum values of P1, P2, and PD
that achieve the QoS constraints. From constraint (15c), when
i = 1, we can find the minimum value of P1 that achieves
constraint (15c) (when i = 1) with equality and this value
is the optimal solution of P1. This is because increasing P1
further leads to decreasing b which consequently decreases
Rs. Hence, the optimal value of P1 is given by
P ∗1 =
σ2v(2
2Rth − 1)
cν2ρ2h21
. (18)
Similarly, the optimal value of P2 is the value that achieves
constraint (15c) (when i = 2) with equality. This is because
increasing P2 further leads to decreasing b which consequently
decreases Rs. After finding P
∗
1 using (18), the optimal value
of P2, using (15c) and when i = 2, is given by
P ∗2 =
(22Rth − 1)(σ2v + cρ2ν2h22P ∗1 )
(cρ2ν2h22)
. (19)
The challenge now is how to find the optimal PD since
constraint (15d) is a function of PD and Rs. It can be
seen that increasing PD leads to increasing the functions
Rui→D, i = 1, 2 and to decreasingRs. Therefore, the optimal
PD is the minimum value of PD that achieves constraint
(15d). Our approach to find feasible and good-performing PD
and w is to first solve the problem under a given value of PD,
then use an outer loop to update PD using bisection search.
From constraint (15e), if PD is given, the maximum DC-
bias b that achieves the constraints is given by
b∗ = IH −
√
P ∗1 −
√
P ∗2 −
√
PD, (20)
and problem (15) can be expressed as (if PD is given)
max
w
σ2RF + h
H
Dww
H
hD
σ2RF + h
H
Eww
HhE
(21a)
s.t. |wi|2 ≤ Pr,i(b), i = 1, 2. (21b)
In the following, we propose two approaches to tackle prob-
lem (21).
B. Charnes-Cooper with SDR Approach
In this approach, we apply Charnes-Cooper method and
SDR to convert (21) into a convex problem. Defining W =
5w
H
w, µ = 1
σ2RF+h
H
Eww
HhE
, and S = µW, problem (21) can
be re-written as follows
max
S,µ
µσ2RF + tr(SHD) (22a)
s.t. µσ2RF + tr(SHE) = 1, (22b)
tr(SEi) ≤ µPr,i(b), i = 1, 2, (22c)
S < 0, Rank(S) = 1, (22d)
where HD = hDh
H
D , HE = hEh
H
E , Ei is a 2×2 matrix with
its ith diagonal entry equals to one and all the other entries
equal to zero, and tr(.) is the trace function. Constraint (22d)
is equivalent to W = wHw. Problem (22) is not convex
because of the rank constraint. However, if we relax the rank
constraint, the problem becomes convex and can be solved
efficiently using the interior point method [25], which can be
implemented using CVX [26]. Since the rank constraint is
relaxed, the resulting S matrix is not guaranteed to achieve
the optimal solution. The authors of [27] showed that if
the number of trace constraints less than or equal three, the
resulting S from (22) is of rank one. However, in some cases,
CVX does not produce an absolute rank one S (i.e., in some
cases CVX produce a matrix S, where the second maximum
eigenvalue is close to zero but not exactly zero). This means
that, theoretically, the proposed SDR approach provides the
optimal solution, but this optimal solution is not numerically
guaranteed. It was shown that the computational complexity
of SDR approach is in the order of O(N7), where N is the
length of w [28], [29].
C. Null Space Beamforming (Zero Forcing (ZF)) Approach
In this section, we propose a simpler approach to find a
solution for (21). We propose to design the beamforming
vector to null the transmitted signal at the eavesdropper. This
approach performs well when the eavesdropper’s channel is
much better than the destination’s channel.
We set w1 = ah
H
E,2 and w2 = −ahHE,1, where a is a scalar
value that should be selected to maximize the secrecy capacity
while satisfying the constraints. With this design for the vector
w, the optimization problem (21) can be expressed as follows
max
a
a(hHE,2hD,1 − hHE,1hD,2) (23a)
s.t. a2|hE,2|2 ≤ Pr,1(b), (23b)
a2|hE,1|2 ≤ Pr,2(b). (23c)
The optimal value of a in (23) can be shown to be given by
a∗ = min
(√
Pr,1(b)
|hE,2| ,
√
Pr,2(b)
|hE,1|
)
. (24)
It is important to note that the computational complexity of
the ZF approach is much lower than that of the SDR approach.
D. Joint Destination’s Power and Beamforming Solution
In this section, we provide the overall algorithm that solves
problem (15). Earlier, we showed that the optimal P1 and P2
are given by (18) and (19), respectively. We also showed that
the optimal PD is the minimum value of PD that achieves
constraint (15d). Since the minimum value of DC-bias b is
not less than IH2 (constraint (15e)) and because of constraint
(15d), the optimal PD is bounded by
G(R(0)s ) ≤ P ∗D ≤
(IH
2
−
√
P ∗1 −
√
P ∗2
)2
, (25)
where
G(R
(0)
s ) = max
(
(2ηR
(0)
s −1)(σ2v+cρ
2ν2h21P
∗
1 +cρν
2h21P2)
(cρ2ν2h21)
,
(2ηR
(0)
s −1)(σ2v+cρ
2ν2h22P
∗
1 +cρν
2h22P
∗
2 )
(cρ2ν2h22)
)
,
and R
(0)
s is the minimum secrecy rate that resulted by setting
PD =
(
IH
2 −
√
P ∗1 −
√
P ∗2
)2
. It can be seen that there
is only a unique value of PD within the range (25) that
maximizes Rs and achieves the constraints. This is because
as we decrease PD , the value of Rs increases and the value
of min(Ru1→D, Ru2→D) decreases, which means that there
is only one value that maximizes Rs and achieves constraint
(15d) with equality. To find the optimal P ∗D, we can apply
the bisection method, where in each step, we have to solve
the problem for w, using either the proposed Charnes-cooper
with SDR or the null space beamforming.
Algorithm 1: Find joint P1, P2, b, PD, and w solution.
Find P1 and P2, using (18) and (19), respectively;
Set a1 = G(R
(0)
s ) and a2 =
(
IH
2 −
√
P ∗1 −
√
P ∗2
)2
;
for for i = 1 : M do
Set P
(i)
D =
a1+a2
2 , and find min(R
(i)
u1→D
, R
(i)
u2→D
);
Find w(i) and then R
(i)
s using either SDR or ZF
approach;
if R
(i)
s −min(R(i)u1→D, R
(i)
u2→D
) < 0 then
Set a2 = P
(i)
D ;
else
Set a1 = P
(i)
D ;
end
if |n−m| ≤ ǫ then
Break;
end
end
Find b∗ = IH −
√
P ∗1 −
√
P ∗2 −
√
P ∗D;
where M is the maximum number of iterations and ǫ is
a positive value selected to be very small to guarantee the
convergence.
IV. PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION WITHOUT
EAVESDROPPER’S CSI
In this section, we assume that the entrusted users and the
VLC AP do not know the instantaneous CSI information of
the eavesdropper, but the statistical information of the eaves-
dropper is known. In this case, we propose three solutions
to improve the secrecy rate. The first is a baseline solution
based on the MRT approach, where the beamforming vector is
designed to maximize the received data rate at the destination.
6The others two approaches are based on generating artificial
noise to confuse the possible eavesdropper. In all approaches,
we allocate the first hop parameters to achieve the constraints
and achieve the required QoS at the entrusted users.
A. Beamforming Approach (Baseline Approach)
In this approach, we assume that the entrusted users assign
all their power to transmit the destination’s message. There-
fore, the achievable secrecy rate is given by
R¯s = min
(
Ru1→D, Ru2→D, Rs,RF ), (26)
where Rs,RF is the average secrecy rate of the RF hop and
it is given by
Rs,RF = E
[
1
2
log2
(
σ2RF + h
H
Dww
H
hD
σ2RF + h
H
Eww
HhE
)]
,
where E[.] is the expectation function [30], [31]. The problem
can then be expressed as follows
max
w,b,P1,P2,PD
R¯s (27a)
s.t. |wi|2 ≤ Pr,i(b), i = 1, 2 (27b)
Rui ≥ Rth, i = 1, 2, (27c)√
P1 +
√
P2 +
√
PD ≤ IH − b (27d)
IH
2
≤ b ≤ IH . (27e)
Solving problem above is not straightforward because the
objective function is not concave and because of the ex-
pectation term. However, we propose a simple, yet effi-
cient, solution and adopt this solution as a baseline to the
second approach. From (27), it can be seen that functions
Ru1→D, Ru2→D, Ru1 , and Ru2 do not rely on the variable
w, while Rs,RF relies on all variables. Hence, we propose
to allocate P1, P2, PD and b to maximize the functions
Ru2→D, Ru2→D and achieve the constraints in (27c)-(27e),
while w is selected to maximize the function Rs,RF . To do
so, the variables b, P1, and P2 must be at their minimum
values and PD must be at its highest value. Therefore, b, P1,
and P2 are given by b =
IH
2 , P1 =
σ2v(2
2Rth−1)
cν2ρ2h21
, and P2 =
(22Rth−1)(σ2v+cρ
2ν2h22P1)
(cρ2ν2h22)
, while PD = (
IH
2 −
√
P1 −
√
P2)
2.
For the given b, P1, P2, PD , problem (27) boils down to
max
w
Rs,RF (28a)
s.t. |wi|2 ≤ Pr,i(b), i = 1, 2. (28b)
The entrusted users transmit the signal so as to maximize
the SNR of the destination. Hence, the solution is given by
wi =
√
Pr,i(b)
|hD,i|
hD,i, i = 1, 2. Note that this beamforming
approach is not a powerful solution for secrecy improving the
secrecy rate if the eavesdropper’s CSI is not known, because
it only aims to maximize the SNR of the destination, while
ignoring the presence of the eavesdropper. A better solution
is to divide the power between beamforming the signal to
the destination and sending a jamming signal to confuse the
eavesdropper.
B. Artificial Noise with SDR Approach
In this approach, the entrusted users divide their harvested
power into two portions: one for forwarding the destination’s
message, and the other jamming. Since the destination’s
channels information is available at the entrusted user, the
jamming signal can be designed to be orthogonal to the
legitimate destination’s channel. Defining |na,i|2 as the power
assigned for the jamming signal at user i, the transmitted
signal of user i is y¯i = wisD+na,iz, where sD and z are the
destination message and the noise signal with E[|sD|2] = 1
and E[|z|2] = 1, respectively. The jamming signal at the
destination can be nulled if we set that na,1 = βhD,2 and
na,2 = −βhD,1, where β is a scalar that can be selected to
maximize the power of the jamming signal. Therefore, the
average achievable secrecy rate is given by
R˜s = min
(
Ru1→D, Ru2→D, R˜s,RF ), (29)
where
R˜s,RF = E
[
1
2
log2
(
1 +
h
H
Dww
H
hD
σ2RF
)
−
1
2
log2
(
1 +
h
H
Eww
H
hE
σ2RF + n
H
a hEh
H
Ena
)]
.
The total transmit power at the entrusted users is ‖w‖2 +
‖na‖2. It can be seen that devoting more power for the
jamming signal would confuse the eavesdropper more, but
this decreases the received signal power at the destination.
Therefore, we first set the minimum required QoS at the
destination and then allocate the remaining power to minimize
the average achievable rate at the eavesdropper. To do so, we
formulate the problem as maximizing the artificial noise power
subject to achieving the required QoS at the destination. The
problem can then be formulated as follows
max
w,na,b,P1,P2,PD
‖na‖2 (30a)
s.t. |wi|2 + |na,i|2 ≤ Pr,i(b), i = 1, 2,(30b)
R˜D ≥ Rth,D (30c)
Rui ≥ Rth, i = 1, 2, (30d)
Rui→D ≥ ηRth,D, i = 1, 2, (30e)√
P1 +
√
P2 +
√
PD ≤ IH − b (30f)
IH
2
≤ b ≤ IH , (30g)
where R˜D =
1
2 log2
(
1 +
h
H
Dww
H
hD
σ2
RF
)
and Rth,D are the
achievable rate and the minimum required data rate at the
destination, respectively. Constraints in (30e) are imposed to
make sure that the average secrecy rate is not limited with the
first hop (i.e., the VLC hop).
First, we should note that the optimal values of the mes-
sages’ powers of the entrusted users can be derived similar
to what is conducted in Section III, where equations (18) and
(19) can be, respectively, used to find P1 and P2. In problem
(30), it can be shown that the optimal PD is the minimum
7value that achieves constraint (30d). Hence, the optimal PD
is given by
P ∗D = max
(
(2ηRth,D−1)(σ2v+cρ
2ν2h21P
∗
1 +cρν
2h21P2)
(cρ2ν2h21)
,
(2ηRth,D−1)(σ2v+cρ
2ν2h22P
∗
1 +cρν
2h22P
∗
2 )
(cρ2ν2h22)
)
. (31)
Therefore, the minimum value of the DC-bias b that can
achieve the constraint is given by
b∗ = IH −
√
P ∗1 −
√
P ∗2 −
√
P ∗D. (32)
For the given P1, P2, PD , and b, solving problem (30) (in
terms only of w,na) is not straightforward since the norm
function is convex (not concave). Since P1, P2, PD , and b
are given and na,1 = βhD,2, na,2 = −βhD,1, problem (30),
can be equivalently written as
max
w,na
β (33a)
s.t. |wi|2 + β2|hD,1|2 ≤ Pr,i(b), i = 1, 2, (33b)
h
H
Dww
H
hD ≥ σ2RF (22Rth,D − 1). (33c)
To simplify problem (33) which is not convex, we introduce
a variable W = wwH and use the SDP approach with
relaxation. Thus (33) can be re-expressed as follows
max
w,na
β (34a)
s.t. tr(WEi) + β
2|hD,1|2 ≤ Pr,i, i = 1, 2, (34b)
tr(WHD) ≥ σ2RF (22Rth,D − 1), (34c)
W < 0, Rank(W) = 1, (34d)
whereEi is 2×2matrix with all its entries equal to zero except
the ith diagonal entry which is equal to one. Constraint (34d)
guarantees thatW = wwH . To simplify problem (34) further,
we drop the rank constraint so that it can be solved efficiently
using the interior point method [25], and can be implemented
using CVX [26]. The resulting W from (34) is of rank one
(because the number of trace constraints is not larger than
three [27]). Nevertheless, the CVX may not produce a rank
one W matrix (i.e., the second highest eigenvalue of the
resulting matrix is close to zero, but not zero), in which case
a randomization method is used to find a good solution using
the resulting W [28].
1) Artificial Noise with Maximum Ratio Transmission:
Since the complexity of using SDR approach is high, we
propose a simpler solution for (33) by using MRT instead
of SDR. We select w to be aligned with hD to maximize the
expression hHDww
H
hD. Therefore, we select w1 = α1hD,1
and w2 = α2hD,2, where α1 and α2 are scalar values selected
to achieve the constraints. Using this substitution, problem
(33) can be rewritten as follows
max
α1,α2,β
β (35a)
s.t. α21|hD,1|2 + β2|hD,2|2 ≤ Pr,1, (35b)
α22|hD,2|2 + β2|hD,1|2 ≤ Pr,2, (35c)
α1|hD,1|2 + α2|hD,2|2 ≥ σRF
√
22Rth,D − 1,(35d)
β ≥ 0. (35e)
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter’s Name Parameter’s Value
VLC AP Bandwidth, B 20 MHz
The physical area of PDs, Ap 1 cm
2
Half-intensity radiation angle, θ1/2 60
o
Gain of optical filter, gof 1
Optical-to-electrical conversion factor,
ρ
0.53 [A/W]
Electric-to-optical conversion factor, ν 10 W/A
Refractive index, n 1.5
Noise PSD of LiFi, N0 10
−21 A2/Hz
Maximum input bias current, IH 600 mA
Minimum input bias current, IL 0 mA
Fill factor, f 0.75
Thermal voltage, Vt 25 mV
Dark saturation current of the PD, I0 10
−10 A
LED height, 3 m
User height 0.85
RF
Bandwidth 16 MHz
PSD of the noise -174 dBm/Hz
The breakpoint distance 5 m
Angle of arrival/departure of LoS 45o
Central carrier frequency 2.4 GHz
Shadow fading standard deviation (after
the breakpoint)
5 dB
Shadow fading standard deviation (be-
fore the breakpoint)
3 dB
Problem (35) is convex and can be solved efficiently using
the CVX. In the following section, we show some simulation
results to assess the secrecy performance of the proposed
approaches with changing some of the system’s parameters.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate the proposed solutions that are used to allocate
the users’ powers, the DC-bias, the beamforming vector, and
the jamming vector to improve the secrecy rate of the Co-
NOMA hybrid VLC/RF system. We examine the effect of the
quality of the channels of the destination and the eavesdropper
by changing their distances from the VLC cell center (circular
coverage area). We also examine the effect of the required
data rates of the entrusted users and of the destination in the
case of unknown eavesdropper’s CSI. Simulation parameters
are provided in Table I. The entrusted users are randomly
distributed in a circle of radius 2 m around the cell center
at (0,0) on the floor level. Monte-Carlo simulation is used
to assess the proposed solutions. Each point in the figures
is the result of 300 different users’ positions. We evaluate
the secrecy performance for different distances between the
destination and the eavesdropper on the one hand, and the
entrusted circle center on the other hand (DD and DE), and
for different required QoS for the users (Rth and Rth,D).
A. The CSI of the Eavesdropper is Known
(n Fig. 2, we show the effect of increasing the distance of
the legitimate destination from the cell center with different
eavesdropper’s distance values. As expected, the secrecy rate
decreases as the distance between the destination and the
entrusted users increases and as the distance between the
eavesdropper and the entrusted users decreases. Fig. 2 also
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is known.
shows that the proposed SDR approach with Charnes-Cooper
outperforms the proposed ZF approach. The performance of
SDR approach is improved by decreasing the eavesdropper’s
channel quality, while the null space beamforming approach
does not get the benefit of decreasing the eavesdropper’s
channel quality. To make this point clearer we show the
effect of degrading the eavesdropper’s channel on the secrecy
capacity in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 shows that the secrecy rate of the null space beam-
forming approach approximately stays fixed as we increase the
distance of the eavesdropper. In contrast, in the SDR approach,
the secrecy rate increases as the channel of the eavesdropper
deteriorates. Also, it can be seen that the null space beam-
forming approach performs better than the SDR when the
channel of the eavesdropper is much better than the channel
of the legitimate destination. Fig. 3 shows that as the channel
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate versus the minimum required Rth at the entrusted users
when the eavesdropper’s CSI is known.
of the eavesdropper gets much closer to the entrusted users, it
is better to apply the null space beamforming approach than
to apply the SDR approach. The relaxed rank constraint in
SDR approach affects its optimality, and this is why SDR
cannot perform better than the null space beamforming when
the eavesdropper is so close to the transmitters. However, the
SDR approach performs better than null space beamforming
when the channel quality of the eavesdropper is less than or
closer to the channel quality of the destination.
In Fig. 4, we show how the minimum required QoS at the
entrusted users affects the secrecy performance. The figure
shows the effect of the required Rth with different destination
and eavesdropper channel qualities. Increasing Rth leads to
decreasing the harvested power at the entrusted users and
to decreasing the achievable rate of the destination coming
from the VLC link (i.e., Rui→D ∀i). Since we assumed that
the VLC bandwidth is higher than that of the RF, the effect
of decreasing Rui→D on the secrecy performance does not
appear at the smaller values of Rth (only decreasing the
harvested power is affecting the secrecy rate). However, with
increasing Rth up to some point, the secrecy performance
starts to be determined by the first hop (the VLC link). This
is the reason why the effect of Rth is significant at higher
values of Rth.
B. The CSI of the Eavesdropper is Unknown
Fig. 5 shows how the minimum required data rate at the le-
gitimate destination affects the secrecy performance. It shows
that the amount of the required artificial noise to maximize the
secrecy capacity depends on the channel quality of both the
eavesdropper and the destination. Specifically, selecting the
value of RthD depends on the location of the eavesdropper.
If the eavesdropper is much closer to the entrusted users
than the destination, minimizing the RthD to maximize the
artificial noise power is the appropriate strategy to improve
the secrecy performance. On the other hand, it is not wise
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate versus the minimum required RthD at the legitimate
destination when the eavesdropper’s CSI is unknown.
to put a high power on emitting the jamming signal if the
eavesdropper is much farther from the entrusted users than
the destination. The figure also shows that the beamforming
approach is not a function of Rth,D, because this approach
beamforms all the available power to the direction of the
legitimate destination. It is shown that the proposed artificial
noise approaches significantly outperform the beamforming
approach in all cases except that the required Rth,D at the
destination is small and the destination is much closer to the
transmitters than the the eavesdropper.
Fig. 6 shows how changing the eavesdropper’s and the
destination’s channel quality would affect the secrecy rate.
It can be seen that decreasing the eavesdropper’s channel
(increasing DE,min, where DE,min is minimum eavesdrop-
per’s distance that the system can achieve such secrecy rate)
slightly improves the secrecy performance when the artificial
noise is applied, while decreasing the destination’s channel
quality significantly decreases the average secrecy rate. In
contrast, the effect of decreasing the eavesdropper’s channel
quality is high when the beamforming approach is applied.
The small effect of the eavesdropper’s channel, when the
artificial noise is applied, is due to the fact that increasing
the eavesdropper’s distance decreases both the received signal
power and noise power. However, the proposed artificial noise
approaches outperform the beamforming approach except in
the case where the eavesdropper is so far from the transmitters.
In addition, if the eavesdropper is located closer to the
transmitters than the destination, the beamforming approach
cannot provide a non-zero secrecy rate.
Fig. 7 shows the effect of the minimum required of data
rates at the entrusted users on the secrecy rate. Clearly,
increasing Rth leads to increasing the minimum required
powers for transmitting the messages at the first hop, which
leads to decreasing PD and the harvested power that is used
for beamforming and jamming in the second hop. In addition,
increasing the required power at the entrusted users decreases
the available power to be assigned for the destination message
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in the first hop, which makes the average secrecy rate limited
by the first hop. In other words, the required QoS at the
entrusted users obviously affects the secrecy performance at
the legitimate destination.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show that the artificial noise SDR
approach outperforms the artificial noise with MRT approach
with the different values of Rth,D, DD, DE,min, and Rth.
This is because the fact that in the SDR approach, we optimize
the beamforing vector w and the power of the artificial noise,
while in Approach 2, we just focus on optimizing the powers
of the beamforming and the jamming signals under the as-
sumption that w is designed to match the destination channel,
and na is designed to cancel the jamming signal at the
destination. However, the artificial noise with MRT approach
is simpler than the SDR approach and generally provides a
much better performance than the baseline (beamforming)
10
approach. The figures also show that the beamforming ap-
proach is unable to provide a positive average secrecy rate
if the eavesdropper is closer to the entrusted users than the
destination.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper evaluated and optimized the physical layer se-
curity in Co-NOMA hybrid VLC/RF system. With the system
model that consists of a single VLC AP, two entrusted users,
one legitimate destination, and one eavesdropper, we consid-
ered the problem of maximizing the secrecy rate at the des-
tination, under QoS constraints, by allocating the messages’
powers, DC-bias, and the beamforming vector. Under the as-
sumption that the eavesdropper’s CSI is known, we considered
the problem of maximizing the secrecy capacity subject to
QoS constraints. We proposed two solutions for such non-
convex optimization problem: one is by using Charnes-Cooper
and SDR and the other is by designing the beamforming
vector to eliminate the signal at the eavesdropper. Simulation
results showed that when the eavesdropper’s CSI is known, the
proposed SDR with Charnes-Cooper method performs better
than the zero-forcing approach if the eavesdropper is a little bit
far from the center of the area of the entrusted users, while
if the eavesdropper gets much closer to the transmitters, it
is better to null the transmitted signal at the eavesdropper.
When the CSI of the eavesdropper is assumed to be unknown,
we considered three approaches: beamforming, artificial noise
with SDR, and artificial noise with MRT. Numerical results
showed that the artificial noise with SDR slightly outper-
forms the artificial noise with MRT and both artificial noise
based approaches significantly outperform the beamforming
approach in terms of average secrecy rate. Numerical results
also showed that whether the CSI is available or not, the
required QoS at the entrusted users significantly compromises
the secrecy performance.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Dang, O. Amin, B. Shihada, and M.-S. Alouini, “What should 6G
be?” Nature Electronics, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 20–29, 2020.
[2] B. Schrenk, M. Hofer, F. Laudenbach, H. Hu¨bel, and T. Zemen,
“Visible-light multi-Gb/s transmission based on resonant cavity LED
with optical energy feed,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 1,
pp. 175–184, 2018.
[3] D. Tsonev, S. Videv, and H. Haas, “Towards a 100 Gb/s visible light
wireless access network,” Optics Express, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 1627–1637,
2015.
[4] L. Yin, W. O. Popoola, X. Wu, and H. Haas, “Performance evaluation of
non-orthogonal multiple access in visible light communication,” IEEE
Trans. Commun., vol. 64, no. 12, pp. 5162–5175, 2016.
[5] H. Marshoud, V. M. Kapinas, G. K. Karagiannidis, and S. Muhaidat,
“Non-orthogonal multiple access for visible light communications,”
IEEE Photon. Technol. Lett, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 51–54, 2016.
[6] X. Zhang, Q. Gao, C. Gong, and Z. Xu, “User grouping and power
allocation for NOMA visible light communication multi-cell networks,”
IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 777–780, 2017.
[7] A. Chaaban, Z. Rezki, and M.-S. Alouini, “On the capacity of the
intensity-modulation direct-detection optical broadcast channel,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 3114–3130, 2016.
[8] M. Obeed, H. Dahrouj, A. M. Salhab, S. A. Zummo, and M.-S. Alouini,
“User pairing, link selection and power allocation for cooperative
NOMA hybrid VLC/RF systems,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.10803.
[9] M. Obeed, H. Dahrouj, A. M. Salhab, A. Chaaban, S. A. Zummo,
and M.-S. Alouini, “Power allocation and link selection for mul-
ticell cooperative NOMA hybrid VLC/RF systems,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:2005.09143.
[10] M. Obeed, A. M. Salhab, M.-Alouini, and S. A. Zummo, “Survey on
physical layer security in optical wireless communication systems,”
in 2018 Seventh International Conference on Communications and
Networking (ComNet), 2018, pp. 1–5.
[11] A. Mostafa and L. Lampe, “Optimal and robust beamforming for secure
transmission in MISO visible-light communication links,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 64, no. 24, pp. 6501–6516, 2016.
[12] L. Yin and H. Haas, “Physical-layer security in multiuser visible light
communication networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 1,
pp. 162–174, 2018.
[13] M. A. Arfaoui, H. Zaid, Z. Rezki, A. Ghrayeb, A. Chaaban, and M.-
S. Alouini, “Artificial noise-based beamforming for the MISO VLC
wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 2866–2879,
April 2019.
[14] Z. Zhang, A. Chaaban, and L. Lampe, “Physical layer security in LiFi
systems,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 2019.
[15] M. F. Marzban, M. Kashef, M. Abdallah, and M. Khairy, “Beamforming
and power allocation for physical-layer security in hybrid RF/VLC wire-
less networks,” in 13th Int. Wireless Commun. and Mobile Computing
Conf. (IWCMC). IEEE, 2017, pp. 258–263.
[16] G. Pan, J. Ye, and Z. Ding, “Secrecy outage analysis of hybrid VLC-
RF systems with light energy harvesting,” in IEEE 18th Int. Workshop
Signal Processing Advances in Wireless Commun. (SPAWC). IEEE,
2017, pp. 1–5.
[17] J. M. Kahn and J. R. Barry, “Wireless infrared communications,” Proc.
IEEE, vol. 85, no. 2, pp. 265–298, 1997.
[18] E. Perahia and R. Stacey, Next Generation Wireless LANs. Cambridge
University Press, 2013.
[19] A. El Gamal and Y.-H. Kim, Network information theory. Cambridge
university press, 2011.
[20] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the mimo wiretap
channel,” IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 4961–4972, 2011.
[21] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, “Improving wireless
physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Processing, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, 2010.
[22] Z. Wang, D. Tsonev, S. Videv, and H. Haas, “On the design of a solar-
panel receiver for optical wireless communications with simultaneous
energy harvesting,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 33, no. 8, pp.
1612–1623, 2015.
[23] M. Obeed, H. Dahrouj, A. M. Salhab, S. A. Zummo, and M.-S. Alouini,
“DC-Bias and power allocation in cooperative VLC networks for
joint information and energy transfer,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 18, no. 12, pp. 5486–5499, Dec. 2019.
[24] C. Li, W. Jia, Q. Tao, and M. Sun, “Solar cell phone charger perfor-
mance in indoor environment,” in Bioengineering Conference (NEBEC),
2011 IEEE 37th Annual Northeast, 2011, pp. 1–2.
[25] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[26] M. Grant and S. Boyd, “CVX: Matlab software for disciplined convex
programming,” 2008.
[27] Y. Huang and D. P. Palomar, “Rank-constrained separable semidefinite
programming with applications to optimal beamforming,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 664–678, 2009.
[28] N. D. Sidiropoulos, T. N. Davidson, and Z.-Q. Luo, “Transmit beam-
forming for physical-layer multicasting,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process.,
vol. 54, no. 6-1, pp. 2239–2251, 2006.
[29] M. Obeed and W. Mesbah, “Efficient algorithms for physical layer
security in two-way relay systems,” Physical Communication, vol. 28,
pp. 78–88, 2018.
[30] J. Li and A. P. Petropulu, “On ergodic secrecy rate for gaussian MISO
wiretap channels,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10, no. 4, pp.
1176–1187, 2011.
[31] A. Chaaban, Z. Rezki, B. Alomair, and M.-S. Alouini, “The MISO
wiretap channel with channel uncertainty: Asymptotic perspectives,” in
2016 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing
(GlobalSIP), 2016, pp. 959–963.
